Reforming Pensions in Europe: Economic Fundamentals and Political Factors by Ondřej Schneider
 
 
Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences 










































Institute of Economic Studies, 
Faculty of Social Sciences, 
Charles University in Prague 
 
[UK FSV – IES] 
 
Opletalova 26 
CZ-110 00, Prague 






Institut ekonomických studií 
Fakulta sociálních věd 
Univerzita Karlova v Praze 
 
Opletalova 26 
110 00   Praha 1 
 





Disclaimer: The IES Working Papers is an online paper series for works by the faculty and 
students of the Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in 
Prague, Czech Republic. The papers are peer reviewed, but they are not edited or formatted by 
the editors. The views expressed in documents served by this site do not reflect the views of the 
IES or any other Charles University Department. They are the sole property of the respective 
authors. Additional info at: ies@fsv.cuni.cz 
 
Copyright Notice: Although all documents published by the IES are provided without charge, 
they are licensed for personal, academic or educational use. All rights are reserved by the authors. 
 
Citations: All references to documents served by this site must be appropriately cited.  
 
Bibliographic information: 
Schneider,  O. (2009).  “  Reforming Pensions in Europe: Economic Fundamentals and Political 
Factors ” IES Working Paper 8/2009. IES FSV. Charles University. 
 
This paper can be downloaded at: http://ies.fsv.cuni.cz  
Reforming Pensions in Europe: 
Economic Fundamentals  





# Institute of Economic Studies, 
Charles University in Prague and 
CESifo, Munich, Germany and 
Georgetown University 






This paper analyzes pension reforms in Europe and their determinants. As pension 
reforms are intrinsically difficult to define and pinpoint, we introduce an alternative 
measure of pension reforms by comparing long-term forecasts of pension 
expenditures for seventeen European countries. The larger the decrease in expected 
spending on public pensions in 2050 between two base years, the more successful a 
pension reform the country achieved (after controlling for other factors, such as 
demography). Our analysis shows that the reform effort varies widely across 
countries and over time. Indeed, only three countries in the EU managed to reduce 
their expected spending on pensions in both reference periods. 
In the second part of the paper, we analyze factors that may facilitate or hamper 
pension reform – quality of fiscal institutions, public debt, trade unions’ influence, 
and also demographic factors. Only the measure of trade union power proves to be 
significant in explaining pension reforms. Other factors, such as quality of fiscal 
institutions, size of the existing funded pillar, public debt or recent demographic 
developments, do not seem to play a significant role. However, specific pension 
system factors – most significantly the lagged change in pension expenditures – are 
significant and suggest that European governments do reform their pension systems 
when faced with the threat of escalating pension expenditures.  
In conclusion, w e propose a hypothesis of  “bounded” economic rationale of 
European governments, as they seem to react to expectations of an increase in 
pension spending, but they seem to be content with the current spending levels. 
The appendix gives detailed information on pension reforms in the ten Central and 
Eastern European countries that became EU members in 2004 and 2007 (EU-10).   
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Public pension systems represent the largest expenditure item in almost all developed 
countries. Countries of the European Union spend 10.6% of their GDP on public pensions on 
average. Indeed, Austria, Poland, and Italy spend as much as 13– 14% of their GDPs on public 
pension schemes.  Moreover, pension expenditures are expected to grow fast as European 
nations age quickly. The European Union estimates that Portugal may spend 20% of its GDP 
in 2050 on pensions only. Several countries (Hungary, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Spain) do 
not lag far behind. Pension systems thus represent a threat to public finance stability and their 
financing may undermine economic growth and competitiveness across the continent. 
The European governments are not ignorant of these trends. Indeed, they regularly introduce 
“pension reforms.” These reforms diverge widely in their consistency and efficiency. In many 
countries, reforms have been enacted only to be scrapped or revised substantially after a few 
years. Indeed, the very term “pension reform” has been compromised, as no clear definition is 
available and widely accepted.  
This paper seeks to categorize pension reforms in the European Union using the alternative 
measure of  a  pension  reform  index. We concentrate on  the  long-term effects of pension 
reforms  as  captured by long-term projections of  pension system expenditures. A p ension 
reform is deemed to be successful if it lowers future expenditures. The larger the decrease in 
expected spending on public pensions in 2050, the more successful a pension reform is. As we 
show, only four countries in the EU managed to reduce their expected spending on pensions 
in both reference periods.  
We also analyze which factors influence pension reforms. As pension reforms have very long-
term effects, their determinants are mostly institutional and political. Our  econometric 
analysis shows that a pension reform’s success depends inversely on the power of trade 
unions and on current pension spending, and positively on  the  expected increase in 
expenditures. Other factors, such as quality of fiscal institutions, size of the existing funded 
pillar, public debt or demographic developments, do not seem to play a significant role. 
Moreover, we show that governments are not concerned by the level of pension spending, but 
do care about its projected change.  2 
 
The paper is organized as follows. We first look at the European pension systems and analyze 
the  main ingredients  of the European reforms. The second section  then provides a  more 
detailed analysis of the existing pension systems in the new member states of the European 
Union (EU-10) and the reforms they have implemented so far. The third section provides an 
analysis of political and institutional factors underpinning pension reforms, namely, the 
interplay between the institutional structure and key decision-making bodies. Following 
papers by James and Brooks (2001) and Schludi (2001), we discuss  the  role of fiscal 
institutions, public debt, trade union clout and other factors and their conduciveness to 
pension reforms. 
In the fourth section we present the data used and discuss a political economy model of 
pension reforms in which we study  the impact of political, demographic, and institutional 
factors on fiscal reforms carried out since 1995 in the European Union. The following section 
discusses the statistical results of our model and provides an economic interpretation of them. 
The l ast  section then summarizes our paper and proposes some tentative policy 
recommendations.  
I. Pension Systems in Europe and Their Main Characteristics 
Pension systems in most European countries are based on the mandatory, quasi-fiscal pay-as-
you-go principle. That makes them exposed to the demographic risk of rapidly aging 
populations. Pension expenditures will rise unless countries take determined action to limit 
them. This can be done either by changing the pension systems’  “parameters”, or by 
undertaking a “radical reform” that changes the fundamental principles of the system. In the 
former case, governments can increase the (effective) retirement age or lower real pension 
benefits, or they can combine the two approaches. In a radical reform, the pay-as-you-go 
system may be (partially) substituted by a system based on accumulation of private savings. 
While the first approach is politically more feasible and provides less uncertainty, the latter 
reform may achieve –  after a fairly long transition process –  more sustainable results.  
European countries have adopted a  plethora of pension reform attempts, some  more 
successful than others. In order to facilitate European reforms, the EU has established a so-
called “open method of coordination” whereby member states share experiences from their 
pension reforms and, possibly, increase the peer pressure on reluctant reformers. Also, as 
Holzmann, MacKellar, and Rutkowski (2003) argue, the method of open coordination was 
originally formulated to prevent discussion about  a single  pan-European pension reform, 
which would weaken  the  national authorities. The first Joint R eport on adequate and 
sustainable pensions was published in 2002. This report did not cover the former communist 
countries that joined the European Union on May 1, 2004. More inclusive Joint Reports have 
been published since 2005.  
The main results, replicated in tables 1 –2 ,  indicate that European pension  systems differ 
substantially. While Italy and Poland spend 14% of their GDPs on public pensions, several 
countries make do with 6–7% of their GDP (see table 1). The standard retirement age is 
typically set at 65, but most Europeans retire earlier: an average French male worker retires at 
58 and a Slovak female worker at 55 years of age. At the other extreme, Portuguese workers 
of both sexes work until 66 and Spanish women retire on average two years later than Spanish 
men (see table 1). 3 
 
Table 1: Gross public pension expenditures as a share of GDP and effective retirement 
age, selected EU countries 
Public pension 
expenditures as % of GDP 
Change  Effective retirement age 
  2004  2050  2004– 2050  Men  Women 
Austria  13.4  12.2  -1.2  59.1  58.1 
Belgium  10.4  15.5  5.1  59.3  58.4 
Czech Republic  8.5  14  5.6  61.5  58.4 
Denmark  9.5  12.8  3.3  64.1  61.4 
Estonia  6.7  4.2  -2.5  na  na 
Finland  10.7  13.7  3.1  60.5  60.1 
France  12.8  14.8  2  58.5  59.2 
Germany  11.4  13.1  1.7  61.7  60.7 
Hungary  10.4  17.1  6.7  58.9  57.3 
Ireland  4.7  11.1  6.4  65.2  64.7 
Italy  14.2  14.7  0.4  60.4  60.9 
Latvia  6.8  5.6  -1.2  na  na 
Lithuania  6.7  8.6  1.8  na  na 
Luxembourg  10  17.4  7.4  59.2  61.3 
Netherlands  7.7  11.2  3.5  60.2  60.5 
Poland  13.9  8  -5.9  61.3  58.0 
Portugal  11.1  20.8  9.7  66.2  65.9 
Slovakia  7.2  9  1.8  59.2  55.5 
Spain  8.6  15.7  7.1  61.1  63.4 
Sweden  10.6  11.2  0.6  65.5  62.5 
United Kingdom  6.6  8.6  2  63.2  61.4 
EU-25 average  10.6  12.8  2.2  na  na 
Source: Economic Policy Committee (2006): Age-related public expenditure projections for the EU-25 Member 
States up to 2050, European Economy, Special Reports. 
 
Table 2 summarizes the generosity of pension systems in European countries as measured by 
the replacement ratio. The ratio diverges widely: from more than 100% of the previous wage 
for most Luxembourgers to some 30% of previous income for above-average earners in 
several countries, including the Czech Republic.  
Table 2 also shows the revenue side of European pension systems. The contribution rates are 
levied on differently defined income, but in all countries the rates are between 20% and 40% 
of eligible income and are often topped up by general tax revenues (only Denmark finances its 
entire system from general taxation).  
The European pension systems thus vary widely in all aspects. There have been attempts to 
categorize them into several groups –  Bismarckian systems with high contribution rates in 
most of continental Europe, the Scandinavian model with a high retirement age and generous 
replacement rates, Anglo-Saxon  “Beveridge” models with low benefits, and finally,  the 
southern model with relatively generous benefits. However, our paper is more concerned with 
pension reforms per se, so we abstain from these qualifications. 
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coverage  Tax financing 
Austria  93.2%    22.8%    2.6% of GDP 
Belgium  63.1%      37.94%  1/3 of total soc. sec. 
financing 
Czech Republic  58.2%    28%     
Estonia  60.9%    22%    6% of soc.sec. pensions 
Denmark  54.1%        Fully financed by taxes 
Finland  71.5%    23.9– 28.2%    1.7% of GDP 
France  68.8%  16.35%      Means-tested minimum 
pensions 
Germany  71.8%    19.5%    27.5% of total pension 
expenditure 
Greece  99.9%    20%    1% of GDP 
Hungary  90.5%  26.5%      2.4% of GDP 




Italy  88.8%    32.7%    Social assistance pensions 
by taxes  
Latvia  81.8%  20%      6.2% of GDP 
Lithuania  71.3%    26%    Special pensions by general 
taxes 
Luxembourg  109.8%    24%    1/3 of contrib. from taxes + 
2.5% 
Netherlands  84.1%    26.2– 33%     
Poland  69.7%    32.52%    3.8% of GDP 
Portugal  79.8%      34.75%  Means-tested minimum 
pensions 
Slovakia  60.2%    24%     
Spain  88.3%      28.3%  Means-tested minimum 
pensions 
Sweden  68.2%  20.2%      Means-tested disability and 
survivors pensions 
United Kingdom  47.6%      19.85%  Means-tested pension 
credits 
Source: European Commission (2007) and OECD (2005) 
 
II. Pension Reforms in the EU-10 
In this section we briefly present the main characteristics of the pension reforms undertaken in 
the ten Central and Eastern European countries that became EU members in 2004 and 2007 
(the EU-10)
1. A detailed discussion of these countries’ pension systems and their reforms is 
given in Appendix 1.  
                                                 
1 We will refer to this group of countries –  Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia –  as the EU-10.  5 
 
Central European countries
2 inherited pension systems firmly rooted in their communist past. 
The main roles of pension systems  were to  prevent poverty, increase dependence on the 
government, and manipulate the labor force. These political objectives yielded pension 
systems with a low retirement age, little variation in pension benefits, and no private pension 
savings. Such systems hindered these countries’ convergence toward richer European 
countries and, due to fast aging, most pension systems in Central Europe dived into deficits in 
the mid-1990s, increasing  the  pressure on governments  grappling  with worsening fiscal 
balances.  
In the mid-1990s, most Central European countries modernized their pension systems, 
separated them from the central government budget, increased the retirement age, and made 
pension benefits more dependent on pension contributions. The Czech Republic implemented 
such a reform in 1994, complemented by the creation of voluntary private pension funds. The 
Czech Republic was actually a frontrunner when it launched (voluntary) private pension funds 
in 1994 and reformed its pension system in 1996 (the  retirement age was increased  and 
pensions were linked to lifetime labor income).  
However, these  “first-wave” pension reforms proved to be insufficient very quickly, as 
Central European societies faced aging phenomena whereby mortality dropped due to better 
health care and improved eating (and drinking) habits.  At the same time, fertility  rates 
collapsed as women faced both greater opportunities in labor markets and greater uncertainty. 
The fertility rate fell as low as 1.17 children born per woman in some Central European 
countries, and old-age pension expenditures are expected to rise rapidly in all countries in the 
region. 
In the late 1990s, Poland and Latvia followed the Swedish example and reformed their 
pension systems to “notionally defined contributions” (NDC) systems, where contributions 
are spent as in a classical pay-as-you-go system, but contributors are credited with a notional 
account where their contributions are indexed by a government-set rule. As Disney (1999) 
shows, significant differences in indexation and revaluation procedures, transition strategies, 
and accumulation of special credits unrelated to contributions to notional accounts make NDC 
systems less transparent.  
Several Central European countries implemented  “radical” pension reforms inspired by 
reforms in Latin America, particularly in Chile, and further boosted by an influential 1994 
World Bank report on pension reform. That study lent support to a “multi-pillar” model of 
pension reform combining a public redistributive pension scheme with a private funded 
pension scheme based on individual accounts. Therefore, structural pension reforms, i.e., 
reforms introducing private pension savings, were embraced in several countries. Hungary 
adopted such a “three-pillar” pension system in 1998. Poland followed suit (with an even 
more comprehensive reform) in 1999, and Estonia and Latvia then implemented reforms in 
2001 and 2002, respectively. Croatia and Bulgaria also reformed their pension systems in 
2002.  The m ost recent reforms were adopted in Ukraine (2003), Lithuania (2004), and 
Slovakia (2005). Hungary reformed its system yet again in 2006 –  see table 3. In total, seven 
of the EU-10 have implemented pension reforms based on partial privatization.
3 The region 
has thus become the second hotbed of so-called “structural” pension reforms (Latin America 
                                                 
2 Most countries in the region  have  implemented either  “parametric” or  “radical” reforms. The parametric 
reforms are more difficult to define  –  most countries change their systems almost continuously (Dusek and 
Kopecsni, 2008). In this paper, we describe reforms that were implemented in the EU-10 countries. For a 
comprehensive overview of Western European pension reforms, see Immergut et al. (2007). 
3 Three other post-communist countries –  Croatia, Kazakhstan, and Russia –  have implemented similar reforms, 
but they are not EU members. 6 
 
being the first). Nevertheless, as the pension system operates in the very long term, the effects 
of these changes are not yet apparent.  
 
Table 3: Pension reforms in CEE countries 
Country  Reform started  Total pension 
contribution  
(% of wages) 
Contribution to 
funded pillar  
(% of wages) 
Pension fund 
assets (% of 
GDP in 2007) 
Bulgaria  2002  27  5  5 
Czech Republic    28 (21.5+6.5)  0  5.1 
Estonia  2002  22 (20+2)  6 (4+2)  5.0 
Hungary  1998, 2006  26.5 (18+8.5)  8  11.2 
Latvia  2001, FF increasing 
until 2010 





2010)  3.0 
Lithuania  2004  26 (23.5+2.5)  5.5  1.5 (2006) 
Romania  2008  27.5  2– 6 (2008–
2016)  0 
Poland  1999  32.52  7.3  12.4 
Slovenia    24.35 
(8.85+15.5)  0  2.7 (2006) 
Slovakia  2005  24 (17+7)  9  4.2 
Source: OECD Global Pension Statistics, European Commission (2006), national ministries. 
 
Pension challenges 
As our discussion illustrates, Central European countries have chosen  various  different 
approaches to pension reform. The vigorous reformers –  namely, Poland, Estonia, and, since 
2005, Slovakia –  have witnessed much more benign developments in their current pension 
spending and, more importantly, they may avoid the stark increases in pension expenditures 
projected for more apathetic countries such as the Czech Republic or Slovenia. For example, 
public pension expenditures are set to remain stable in Estonia at about 7% of GDP. 
Expenditures will fall in Poland from 14% of GDP in 2004 to some 9% in 2050. On the other 
hand, pension expenditures will rise to 17% of GDP in Slovenia and to 15% in the Czech 
Republic. Hungary demonstrates that an imperfect pension reform coupled with government 
inconsistency and political maneuvering may even exacerbate the long-term outlook (the most 
recent reform of 2006 has not yet been incorporated into the projections). 
Pension systems do not, however, interact with public budgets only. Their impact is felt 
throughout the economy, most profoundly in labor and capital markets. Table 2 shows the 
total contributions to the pension systems in  various  countries. Beyond any doubt, 
contribution rates of  around 30% of the wage bill render labor less competitive in these 
countries and increase unemployment. The countries that have implemented pension reforms 
have channeled part of this burden to private savings, i.e., they have eliminated part of the 
deadweight loss associated with  the  apparent tax nature of pension contributions. Also, 
pension reformers tend to have  a  larger stock of assets accumulated in pension funds, 
although the depth of assets is still minuscule. This building up of savings makes domestic 7 
 
capital markets more efficient and may help countries to limit the current account deficits 
associated with large capital inflows.  
Looking at the EU as a whole, Estonia, Latvia, Sweden, and the UK seem to be best prepared 
for the aging process, as their spending on pensions is limited. Ireland belongs to this category 
as well, despite its high forecasted increase in spending. Another group of countries  –  
Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Austria, Slovakia, and Finland 
–  have introduced reforms that stabilize their pension expenditures, albeit at a relative high 
level. The most pressing problems face the Czech Republic, Greece, Spain, Hungary, 
Portugal, and Slovenia.
4  
III. Political Economy of Pension Reforms   
Pension reforms have been highly controversial all across the world. Only in the 1990s, as 
Chile’s pension reform began to be seen as a success,  did governments start to consider 
pension reforms based on partial or full privatization. Two regions stood out as hotbeds of 
pension reform. Chile inspired many of its Latin American neighbors to implement variations 
of its reform. The second region to embrace structural pension reforms enthusiastically was 
Central and Eastern Europe, where governments were struggling with a heritage of socialist 
egalitarian pension systems with universal coverage, low retirement ages, and disastrous 
impact on labor markets.  
Wherever introduced, pension reforms were met with great political opposition. Different 
(and often large and influential) interest groups defended the existing public pension and often 
succeeded in creating a broad coalition of public support for preserving the status quo policy 
design (see Pierson, 1996). Since pension reform imposes direct costs on beneficiaries of the 
status quo while offering only distant benefits to a broader constituency of citizens (such as a 
more financially sustainable pension system) this reform is rarely desired by the median voter 
(Kitschelt,  2001) and is sometimes labeled a  “politically infeasible” policy (Pierson  and 
Weaver, 1993; Pierson, 1994).  
Some authors (see Muller, 1999) stress that the diffusion of market-oriented pension reforms 
in Central Europe was promoted by the World Bank. However, other authors show that the 
WB was used as a “scapegoat” by reform-minded governments (Rocha et al., 2001). A more 
important factor seems to have been internal divisions within governments. Most often, as in 
Poland and Hungary, the finance ministry supported market-oriented pension reforms with a 
high share of capital-funded provision for old age, while the ministries of labor and social 
affairs advocated a parametric reform. A similar split is evident between economists (typically 
for the market-oriented approach) and sociologists and lawyers (typically for gradual reform) 
in many countries. In some other countries, such as the Czech Republic and Slovakia until 
1998, the finance ministry did not support radical pension reform, as high contribution rates 
and almost universal coverage allowed pension systems to generate surpluses. Indeed, the 
Czech Finance Ministry shied away from supporting a (modest) reform proposal of the Labor 
Ministry in 1997.  
Another key parameter of pension reforms in Central Europe was trade union position. Trade 
unions are often the leading player within the pension reform opposition and, depending on 
their role and power in the country, they often blocked reforms even though their members 
would probably have benefited from them –  see the discussion of the Czech Republic’s and 
Slovenia’s reform attempts in Appendix 1. Trade unions seem to be willing to accept changes 
                                                 
4 Malta and Luxemburg also face major increases in their pension spending, but they are not discussed in this 
paper. For a discussion, see European Commission (2006a) and its Technical Annex.  8 
 
to the system only when they are convinced that without the changes, the pension system may 
collapse. The Polish and Czech experience illustrates this approach squarely. 
In the early 1990s, the Polish trade  union movement Solidarity was an influential actor 
fighting for the improvement of pensioners’ income by advocating indexation and 
valorization. Only when the trade unions were transformed into a political party and became a 
part of government did their role change, and in the late 1990s they supported privatization 
pension reforms in Poland. In contrast, the Czech trade unions have opposed any change to 
the pension system. Indeed, the first comprehensive strike after the collapse of communism 
was organized by  the  trade unions in 1995 to protest against the raising of the official 
retirement age. Even though the strike was unsuccessful, it ushered in  a  highly political 
approach to pension reform that has dominated the Czech scene ever since.  
“Benefit of crises” is another hypothesis, proposed by,  among others,  Drazen and Grilli 
(1993). A preceding crisis, for example rising deficits in the pension system or late payments 
of benefits, may increase the population’s acceptance of reforms. A crisis also weakens the 
opponents of reform and increases the power of pro-reform actors, who often, but not always, 
include the ministry of finance or the financial industry. 
One may speculate that governments tend to reform those pension systems  which  risk 
destabilizing public finances the most. If a pension system has a large implicit debt, i.e., the 
net present liabilities of the system toward either the working or the living, or even all future 
generations, the government should have incentives to rein in the system to make it less of a 
risk to the future fiscal balance. However, a high implicit debt makes pension reform less 
likely, as the government may be scared by the size of the debt, which is, at least partially, 
made explicit during the reform.
5 
Other set of institutions that might have influenced the pension reforms in Central Europe is 
their election systems. As Persson (2032) claims, two election systems have distinctive effects 
on social security systems (and their reforms). In a direct election system with single-member 
districts, successful candidates concentrate on  the  tangible effects  on their geographically 
defined constituencies, where old-age voters are in  the  minority. Once in government,  a 
directly elected government is more exposed to criticism and finds it harder to “avoid blame” 
by sharing the political costs of a reform with coalition partners or to “obfuscate” changes in 
the pension system by complex formulae or long transition periods (see Weaver, 1986). On 
the other hand, a proportional election system favors wide-agenda political parties. Social 
security and pensions represent a very attractive policy in the proportional system, as such a 
policy targets the well-defined and single-issue-concentrated voter group of pensioners. In the 
transition context this effect is even stronger, as there are no private pensions, so all 
pensioners as well as people close to retirement depend exclusively on public pensions and 
thus on politicians.  
However, the empirics are very inconclusive in this respect in Central Europe. Some countries 
with strong aspects of the proportional electoral system (the Baltic countries, Hungary) have 
implemented reforms, while some other “proportionalists” (Slovenia, the Czech Republic) 
have remained very cautious and have not reformed their systems. Appendix 1 contains a 
detailed discussion of the main features of the pension systems in the ten Central and Eastern 
European  countries  that joined the EU in 2004 and in 2007.  We describe  the  systems’ 
parameters and then turn to the political aspects of the reforms and the future challenges that 
these pension systems face. 
                                                 
5 That has been the argument of the Czech Labor Ministry –  one cannot help seeing the irony in the argument: 
the worse (financially) the system is designated, the more expensive its reform is. 9 
 
What seems least controversial, though, is the fact that the longer countries wait to initiate 
necessary pension reforms, the more difficult those reforms will be to implement. Pension 
reforms require the support of a majority of voters, and reforms that aim at reducing the size 
of unfunded pension systems are likely to be opposed by the rapidly aging societies in Central 
Europe.  
IV. Model Specification and Data 
Our model uses data from the 17 European countries that are both EU and OECD members, 
so that consistent data are available.
6 The data set thus does not include the three Baltic 
countries (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) and Slovenia. While this is clearly a loss, the data 
available simply do not allow these four to be included. The 17 countries analyzed here have 
adopted a wide array of pension reforms, from expansion of the scheme in Portugal to partial 
privatization in Poland, so the sample captures the main pension trends in Europe. The data 
were assembled from various sources. Most come from the EU’s Special Report: European 
Economy No. 1/2006, which analyzed the impact of aging on public expenditures (European 
Commission, 2006b),  from a  European Commission staff working document providing 
detailed data on 25 EU member countries (European Commission, 2006a),  and from the 
country reports of the Observatoire Social Europé en, but national sources were used as well. 
Earlier data were assembled using OECD datasets and papers from the mid-1990s, for 
example Roseveare et al. (1996). 
Dependent variable: Pension reform index 
The dependent variable of our model is constructed  so  as to allow analysis of all EU 
countries, even though strictly speaking they might  not have implemented a  “reform” as 
defined in the previous literature. We measure the pension reform index (PRI) by comparing 
expenditure on public pension schemes in 2050 as expected in 1995, 1999 and 2005. Thus, 
pension reform in 1995– 1999 is summarized by the change in expectations of pension 
expenditures in 2050 between these two years. If expectations were lower in 1999 than in 
1995, the pension reform resulted in a reduction of pension expenditures. 
This measure has some weaknesses, of course. The change in expectations may have been 
driven by factors  other  than pension reforms (productivity assumptions, demographic 
projections). We try to control for  demographic a ssumptions by including a demographic 
variable in our regression (see below). Other factors are more complex, but we believe that 
our measure of pension reform efforts still captures governments’ efforts as well. Note that it 
provides  a  more detailed (and  continuous) data set t h an most binary reform indices. 
Furthermore, our definition of a pension reform is much more inclusive than those in the 
previous literature. We do not examine the nature or structure of the reform, whereas, for 
example, James and Brooks in Holzmann and Siglitz (2001) include only  “pension 
privatization” in their definition. In such a setting, high pension expenditure makes pension 
privatization less likely, but this is not necessarily the case in our model. 
As table 4 reveals, the most vigorous reformers in 1995– 1999 were Poland and Italy, which 
both managed to cut their expected pension expenditures in 2050 by more than 6% of GDP. 
On the other hand, Ireland witnessed its expectations rise by 6% of GDP. 
The same method then is applied to the period 1999– 2005: the country that cut its expected 
pension outlays most in this period was Austria, where expectations of pension expenditure in 
                                                 
6 Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, France, Hungary, Spain, Ireland, I taly, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Greece had to be eliminated 
for a lack of data. 10 
 
2050 fell from 17% of GDP to 12.2% of GDP. In the same period, expectations in Portugal 
rocketed by 7.6% of GDP! 
Table 4 illustrates the pension reform index in the two periods. While Italy and Poland remain 
the two largest  reformers overall, Finland, Spain, and Germany emerge as consistent 
reformers who cut, albeit modestly, their expected expenditures for 2050 in both periods (their 
PRIs are positive in both periods). Other countries (Belgium, Austria, the Netherlands, and 
Portugal) zigzagged between the two periods, cutting in one and expanding in the other. 
Pension expenditure expectations grew in both periods in Ireland, the UK, and Hungary. 
 
Table 4: Pension Reform Index 
 
Expenditures as % of GDP in 
2050 expected in  Pension reform index 
  1995  1999  2005  1999/1995  2005/1999 
Belgium  15.1  13.3  15.5  1.8  -2.2 
Czech Republic  12.0  14.6  14.0  -2.6  0.6 
Denmark  11.5  13.3  12.8  -1.8  0.5 
Germany  17.5  16.9  13.1  0.6  3.8 
Greece  24.0  24.8  24.8  -0.8  0.0 
Spain  19.1  17.3  15.7  1.8  1.6 
France  14.4  15.8  14.8  -1.4  -1.0 
Ireland  3.0  9.0  11.1  -6.0  -2.1 
Italy  20.3  14.1  14.7  6.2  -0.6 
Hungary  15.0  17.0  17.1  -2.0  -0.1 
Netherlands  11.4  13.6  11.2  -2.2  2.4 
Austria  14.9  17.0  12.2  -2.1  4.8 
Poland  15.0  8.3  8.0  6.7  0.3 
Portugal  16.5  13.2  20.8  3.3  -7.6 
Slovakia  11.0  12.0  9.0  -1.0  3.0 
Finland  17.7  15.9  13.7  1.8  2.2 
Sweden  14.5  10.7  11.2  3.8  -0.5 
UK  4.1  4.4  8.6  -0.3  4.2 
Source: Author. 
 
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the PRI and pension expenditures. We observe a 
complex pattern where pension reform (a positive PRI) is pursued in countries with both high 
and low expenditures and where pension escalation (a negative PRI) occurs in both the cheap 
Irish and the expensive Portuguese systems. 
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The independent variables used in the model reflect the political economy theory discussed in 
the previous section. We include variables on trade union power, public debt, quality of fiscal 
institutions, pension expenditures, and demographic projections. Some other obvious 
candidates (implicit pension debt) could not be included due to a lack of data. 
Trade union power. Trade unions are, as discussed above, often the principal opponent of 
reform. Thus, their position and power within the country may influence the pension reform 
outcome. Two measures of trade union power are used. The first is the trade union density 
(TUD). The higher the share of the labor force that belongs to a union, the bigger clout the 
unions have. Data on trade union density are available and vary from 10% in France to 75% 
in Denmark. As these two numbers already indicate, the density probably poorly reflects the 
real position of trade unions. That’s why we include another variable, collective bargaining 
coverage (CBC), which may better signal the unions’ power. In many EU countries, trade 
unions negotiate wages for 90% of the labor force, even though their membership is much 
lower. In Austria, 98% of contracts are covered by trade union bargaining. The Czech 
Republic represents the other extreme,  with only 27% of contracts following trade union 
bargaining.  
Fiscal institutions (FI). The literature on fiscal institutions and their impact on budgetary 
outcomes is burgeoning. A correct institutional setup is believed to counteract the deficit bias 
of politicians –  see Schuknecht (2004) or Schneider et al. (2007) for a discussion. Proper 
fiscal institutions should prevent governments from amassing large pension debts and should 
facilitate restrictive reforms. Buti, Mongay, and von Hagen (2002) discuss fiscal institutions 
in the “old” EU member countries, while Fabrizio and Mody (2006) provide a comprehensive 
analysis of fiscal institutions in Central European countries. The highest index of fiscal 
institutions –  4 –  is to be found in Denmark and Belgium. Spain used to have as low as 1.08 in 
1997, but improved to 2.28 in 2004. Among the new EU members, Poland has the most 
robust financial framework (2.72), while the weakest performer is Hungary with an index of 
1.37 in 2004. Hungary (together with France and the UK, but they are both at a higher level) 
witnessed a worsening in its fiscal institutions between 1997 and 2004.  
Pension expenditures. Another pension reform factor is pension expenditure, both current 
and expected. We use two variables to capture the impact of pension expenditures, as their 
impact is complex. First, current expenditures ( Expenditures)  measure current pension 
outlays. Second, we use the variable  DExp  to  capture the recent change in pension 12 
 
expenditures. Last,  the  variable  DE2050  measures the current expectations of pension 
expenditures in 2050
7. As discussed above, pension expenditure levels and trends within the 
EU vary widely. Current expenditures are as high as 14% of GDP in Italy and Poland or as 
low as 5% in Ireland. By 2050, pension expenditures are expected to rise by as much as 10% 
of GDP in Portugal or to fall by almost 6% of GDP in Poland.  
Pension expenditures may have different effects on pension reform. On the one hand, the 
higher are expenditures, or the expected rise thereof, the more likely the government may be 
to introduce a r eform. On the other hand, high pension expenditures generate  a  broader 
alliance opposing reform. The following section discusses our estimates of the final effects.  
Prefunding. This variable measures the extent to which private pensions are entrenched in a 
given country. The more widespread private pensions are, the less shock a reform of the 
government pillar represents, as people have other sources to turn to. The Netherlands, 
Denmark, and Sweden seem to be best prepared in this respect, as some 90% of their workers 
contribute to a pension fund. The share is as low as 2% in France or 4% in Finland.  
Public debt. The level of overall government debt as a percentage of GDP is taken as a 
measure of the financing constraint. The influence of the public debt on pension reform may 
be twofold. On  the  one hand, high debt makes pension reform more pressing, as the 
government cannot afford a further increase in the debt. On the other hand, high debt makes 
(structural) pension reform more difficult, as  governments  find it difficult to finance the 
necessary transition period.  The highest debts among our sample were recorded by  Italy 
(105% of GDP in 2000 and 106% in 2005) and Belgium (103% of GDP in 2000). The lowest 
debt was recorded by Ireland in 2005 (28% of GDP) and the Czech Republic in 2000 (29% of 
GDP).  
Demographic developments.  We measure the dynamics of  the  demographic situation by 
comparing old-age ratios projected for  the  year 2050 in 1995, 2000, and 2005. In most 
countries, the demographic outlook gradually worsened, as the old-age ratio was increasing. 
In 1995, Spain expected the share of people older than 64 years of age to be “only” 41% in 
2050. Ten years later, the share is expected to reach 66%. Similarly, in 1995 Ireland expected 
only a 25% share for 2050; now it is 45%. The Belgium, Dutch, and Scandinavian estimates 
have barely budged.  
 
V. Results of the Model Estimation 
Explaining the systematic patterns of pension reforms in the European Union is bound to be 
imperfect. A pension reform is very complex and is influenced by a host of factors, many of 
them indigenous and ad-hoc. Moreover, the data are far from comprehensive: we are limited 
to 17 countries and two periods, i.e., we have only 34 observations when we use panel data 
regression methods. Any results must therefore be treated carefully. Nevertheless, we believe 
that our analysis provides some useful insights into the complex political process of pension 
reform.  
Table 5 summarizes four regressions in which we regressed our dependent variable PRI –  the 
pension reform index –  on combinations of the independent variables. We use two measures 
                                                 
7 Note that DE2050 is not necessarily correlated with the pension reform index  PRI. The PRI measures the 
change between two expectations –  the expectation of 2050 pension expenditures in 1995, 1999 or 2005. The 
DE2050 measures the change in pension expenditures between the current year and 2050. The correlation 
between the two series is lower than 0.3.  13 
 
of the trade unions’ position in the process: their density  TUD and collective bargaining 
coverage CBC. Similarly, we use three definitions of pension system distress. The variable 
EXP measures current pension expenditures,  DE2050 measures the expected change in 
pension expenditures between the current year and 2050, and finally DExp measures the most 
recent change in current pension expenditures. The table presents four combinations of these 
two groups of variables.  
 
Table 5: Determining factors of pension reform 
  CBC, Exp, 
DE2050, DExp 
 
CBC, Exp, DE2050  CBC, DE2050 
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(3.664)   








(0.689)   
0.00138  -0.00375  0.00457  -0.03765 





































3.878  3.431  3.733  3.226 







(1.177)   
-0.3931  -0.3927    -0.4168 
***







(0.197)   









0.5713  0.6036  0.4722  0.5137 
***
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within  0.4262   0.4106   0.1564   0.3863   
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2 
between  0.6973   0.6673   0.5607   0.4914   
R
2 
total  0.5347   0.5032   0.3138   0.4216   
Note: The dependent variable is the pension reform index (positive values for increasing expectations of pension 
expenditures in 2050). FI is the fiscal institutions index. PD is the level of government debt. CBC is the coverage of 
workers with collective bargaining. TUD is the trade union density. PF is the share of workers with a funded pension. 
Demogr is the change dependency ratio. Exp is the current level of pension expenditures. DE2050 is the increase in 
pension expenditures by 2050. DExp is the recent change in pension expenditures. Random-effect panel-data estimation 
with robust standard error type. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1 percent, 5 percent, 
and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
Table 5 reveals that several variables do not seem to be significant in any specification of the 
model: public debt, the share of workers with a funded pension, and the recent change in 
pension expenditures are all insignificant in all four specifications (except for significance at 
the 10% level for public debt in the last specification). Similarly, fiscal institutions (i.e., 
proper management of the budgetary process, limits on legislative budgetary modifications, 
etc.) do not play a significant role in explaining pension reform occurrences. Their coefficient 
is significant in one specification only, even though it has the expected sign (the more robust 
fiscal institutions are, the more successful the pension reform is).  
Immediate demographic factors seem to have a limited role in pension reform, as witnessed 
by  the  low significance of the demographic variable in our model. It is interesting, 14 
 
nevertheless, that an increase in the dependency ratio is associated with a cost-cutting pension 
reform. 
The role of trade unions is more complex. While the density of trade union membership is not 
significant, collective bargaining coverage seems to worsen  the  public reform outcome, 
increasing pension expenditures expected in the future. One may speculate that influential 
trade unions treat pensions as deferred wages, so when negotiating collective contracts, they 
prevent any reduction in future pension claims. 
As expected, the most important variable is expenditure on pensions. The current level of 
expenditures  (EXP) makes pension reform less likely. On the other hand,  the change in 
expenditures that is expected in the future is highly conducive to pension reform. This result 
may indicate that governments do react to expectations of increasing pension expenditures, 
but they are unmoved by the level of pension expenditures. This would suggest that European 
countries are close to the “social equilibrium” as far as their pension systems are concerned: 
they do not want to cut expenditures below the current level, but e xpectations of higher 
expenditures nudge them toward pension reform.  
Table 5 further suggests that the model is more successful in explaining different pension 
reform efforts between the two periods, but that pension reforms in any given period are much 
more difficult to analyze. This may explain the lack of rigorous estimates of the pension 
reforms in the European Union: most studies concentrate on a single period of time. Our 
model uses panel data that cover, in fact, data from 1995 until 2005. By splitting the period 
into two sub-periods, we might have been able to capture some dynamic effects previously 
too subtle to be reported.  
VI. Conclusions 
The pension crisis, as it is often described, neatly illustrates that challenges may be turned into 
opportunities if governments take early and well designed action. Aging is not something we 
should try to prevent. What turns aging into a threat is ineffective pension systems created by 
a series of governments in the past. If pension systems are modernized and their incentives are 
set straight to stimulate labor market participation and not to encourage inactivity, aging will 
lose most of its negative connotations.  
Our analysis shows that European governments reform their pension systems frequently, but 
often inconsistently. Pension reforms often fail to counterbalance demographic pressures and 
do not curtail future pension expenditures. We have also illustrated that several countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe have undergone major and substantial pension reforms that 
should streamline their pension systems in the decades to come. The higher willingness of the 
“new” EU members was probably driven by their inefficient pension systems inherited from 
past communist regimes. 
Our analysis shows, however, that even “old” EU members may enact substantial reforms –  
witness the Italian or Austrian examples. These reforms, though, remain fragile and are often 
reversed  or diluted soon after their implementation. This may  signal strong entrenched 
interests that will prevent pension reforms from cutting future obligations consistently. Strong 
trade unions may represent such an entrenched interest group, as they are often the most vocal 
opponents of pension reforms. 
Detailed econometric analysis shows, nevertheless, that  pension reforms in the European 
Union are positively associated with expectations of escalating expenditures in the years to 
come. As governments fear increasing expenditures, they often do react and do implement 
reforms that bring expenditure expectations back down. Our analysis indicates, though, that 15 
 
governments are not concerned with the existing level of pension expenditures, even though 
they are often high and hamper fiscal management and undermine the long-term economic 
growth of some European countries. 
While there is little new in the finding that policy reforms are path-dependent, this analysis 
offers a new causal mechanism through which the existing policy design shapes the trajectory 
of change in policy design: the transitional cost of structural reform. The more expensive is 
the current pension system, the more expensive is its structural reform. Thus, the large and 
generous pension systems embedded in many “old” EU countries may prevent radical reforms 
like those implemented in some “new” EU member countries. As our dataset does not include 
some more ardent reformers (Estonia, Lithuania) we cannot unambiguously prove this 
hypothesis, but it remains a possibility and it should be a priority for future research. 16 
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Appendix 1: Pension Reforms in the EU-8: Detailed Analysis 
In this section we discuss the main features of the pension systems in the ten Central and 
Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004 and in 2007. We first describe the 
systems’ parameters and then turn to the political aspects of  the  reforms and the future 
challenges that these pension systems face. 
 
A.  BULGARIA 
Bulgaria, which entered the EU in 2007, has the highest share of people older than 65 in its 
population (17% according to the 2004 World Bank Development Record). The Bulgarian 
pension system suffered from rising expenditures (10% of GDP in 1993) and from a falling 
real value of pensions, which lost more than 50% of their value in the early 1990s. Early 
retirement was common and the contribution rate may have been as high as 52% of wages 
(Palmer, 2007). Almost 2 million workers stopped contributing to the system between 1993 
and 2003 (some 45% of labor force participants).  
The system was thoroughly reformed in 2000. The reform was motivated by a deep crisis in 
1996– 1997, when Bulgaria experienced a sharp increase in poverty and unemployment. The 
present pension system is based on four pillars. The  first (state and mandatory) pillar 
consists of a means-tested social pension for those who do not qualify for the PAYG pension. 
To qualify for the PAYG pension the sum of the person’s age and the number of years of 
participation in the pension system must be more than 100 for men and 91 for women (rising 
to 94 by 2010). If this requirement is not met, the retirement age is 65 for both sexes. In 2002, 
the contribution rate was decreased to 27% and in 2007 it was 8.05% of gross wages for 
employees and 14.95% for employers.  
There are still two categories of workers: some 150,000 workers are in the privileged 
Category 1 with faster accumulation of claims and more lenient early retirement rules. Special 
categories of workers should be phased out by 2010.  
PAYG benefits are some 40% of the average wage and are not taxed. Pensions are indexed 
annually by a coefficient equal to 75% of inflation + 25% of wage growth.  
The second pillar is mandatory for all workers born later than 1960. The pillar is privately 
managed and consists of individual financial accounts organized in occupational or universal 
pension funds. Furthermore, the pillar provides privately managed occupational plans for 
persons covered by special privileges under the old system. The contribution rate was 
originally 2% and was gradually increased to 5% in 2007 paid exclusively by employers (the 
contribution rate is 12% for workers in the privileged category 1). It is expected that the 
second pillar will provide benefits roughly equal to 20% of the wage. Coverage of the second 
pillar increased from 30% of the labor force in 2002 to 70% in 2007 (a further 15% of the 
labor force is covered by voluntary pillars), but assets are still quite low –  around 5% of GDP 
in 2007.  
The third pillar is voluntary and not subsidized by the government. The government expects 
that the pillar will provide benefits of some 10% of wages. The fourth pillar was introduced in 
2007.  It comprises voluntary occupational pensions and is similar to those in Western 
countries and is still in its infancy.  
The Bulgarian pension reform was introduced after a severe economic crisis and as a part of a 
major reform package. Political economy aspects were thus subdued and did not re-emerge 
until 2007, when  the  new government stopped  the  rebalancing of employee-employer 
contributions for the first pillar.  20 
 
B.  CZECH REPUBLIC 
The present pension system was introduced through a series of new measures, most notably 
the Pension Insurance Act of 1996. The reformed system follows the conservative-corporatist 
model implemented within the Bismarckian family. It is based on the key role of the public 
pillar, supplemented by voluntary supplementary schemes. 
The 1996 reform increased the retirement age to 63 years for men (to be reached in 2016) and 
63 for women without children (to be reached in 2019). Early retirement is possible 3 years 
earlier. In 2004, the government raised the contribution rate to 28% of the wage bill, with no 
ceiling on higher salaries. A ceiling of three times the national average wage was introduced 
in 2007. 
The  first (public and mandatory) pillar consists of two sub-clusters  –   a f lat-rate basic 
amount equal for all pensions, and  an  earnings-related portion financed through social 
contributions and related to employment. Contribution credits have been introduced for 
periods of unemployment, years of study, parental leave, etc. Indexation is related to prices 
and 1/3 of salaries. Benefits are calculated in line with the pay-as-you-go mechanism and 
financed through contributions paid by employees and by employers (the largest part) and 
through state compensatory contributions. The retirement age is flexible subject to at least 25 
years of contributions. Minimum pensions are not defined, while social assistance benefits 
have the role of a basic safety net for people in need. This net consists of state social support 
and social assistance benefits.  
The supplementary (private and voluntary) pillar then comprises fully funded pension 
funds. It is run by private institutions. This supplementary pillar is regulated by the Czech 
National Bank. Moreover, the government tops up private contributions to funds. Further 
individual private and voluntary schemes consist of individual savings in the f orm of life 
insurance and administered by insurance companies. Supplementary schemes cover more than 
2.5 million people (around 50% of  the  total labor force). In 2007, pension fund assets 
amounted to 5% of GDP. 
The Czech Republic faces a steep increase in financial expenditure on pension programs, even 
though in the recent past they have gained a financial equilibrium that in the 1990s allowed a 
decrease  in  social contributions. The lack of structural reform makes the Czech system 
extremely exposed to demographic risks, as funded pensions remain insignificant.  
The politics of pension reform in the Czech Republic have been dominated by diverging 
interests. Since the mid-1990s, the financial sector has assembled a very feeble campaign 
advocating pension system reform. These claims have been supported by liberal economists 
from academia and  the  government and by demographics experts predicting a  massive 
worsening of the demographic parameters underlying the pension system. These concerns, 
however, have been more than counterbalanced by strong opposition from trade unions and 
by the  passivity of the Labor Ministry, which  has  never adopted any substantial reform 
agenda. Trade unions have argued that reforms would undermine the principle of universal 
social insurance. In addition, the Czech Republic, with its relatively low levels of external 
debt, has been less subject to the influence of international financial organizations, which 
favor privatization strategies (see Müller, 2002). 
   
C.  ESTONIA 
Estonia reformed its pension system in 1999– 2001. The present pension system is based on 
three main pillars. The  first (state and mandatory) pillar  consists of  a  residence-based 21 
 
national pension and an employment-related old-age pension. The basic national entitlement 
is a flat-rate benefit based on residence. It is granted to persons who do not have the right to 
old-age benefits and is financed through general taxation. National pensions at the same time 
represent the basic part of employment-related benefit. This entitlement covers the active part 
of the population, is based on social contributions paid by employers and the self-employed, 
and uses the defined-benefit method. Early  retirement is available only for certain 
occupational groups (e.g. miners, mariners, etc.).  
State pensions represent about 80% of the total net disposable income of retired people. As a 
consequence of all these features, the first pillar is strongly redistributive. In 2001, total public 
pension spending was 6.9% of GDP, but pensions in Estonia are not taxable. The retirement 
age is officially 63 for both men (this target age was reached in 2001) and women (target to 
be reached in 2016), but early retirement is possible three years prior to the official retirement 
age. The average net replacement rate of old-age pensions in the second half of the 1990s was 
around 40– 45% (gross replacement rate 32– 36%). The contribution rate is 24% of the wage 
bill (22% paid by firms, 2% by employees). Only employers’ contributions remain in the 
PAYG system; employees finance the funded pillar. 
The second (public/private and mandatory) pillar  comprises supplementary funded 
pensions introduced in 2002. They will start to pay benefits in 2009. Hence, their 
implementation is still in progress and will be completed in the next 20 years. Participation is 
obligatory for workers born after 1983. By 2005, more than 75% of the labor force had joined 
the system. The supplementary pillar is run by private institutions: fund managers affiliated to 
banks, insurance companies, and investment banks. The second pillar is financed through a 
2% contribution by employees, supplemented by a further 4% contribution by the state. It is 
thus based on a mix of the “carve-out” and “top-up” methods. The Guarantee Fund covers 
losses incurred by scheme participants (but not investment risks). The second tier is expected 
to represent 9% of the average pensioner’s income in 2009, increasing to 24% in 2020 and 
43% in 2030. In 2007, assets from the funded part of the mandatory pillar amounted to 5% of 
GDP.  
The  supplementary, voluntary, and private pillars  were introduced in 1998 and then 
revised in 2002. They are implemented through pension insurance policies offered by licensed 
private insurance companies, or through units of pension funds managed by private managers. 
Important tax incentives were adopted by the state to favor their development.  
Given that the Estonian government plans to keep an average replacement rate of 40%, the 
main challenge is to reach such a level in the future without placing financial strains on the 
first public pillar. The Estonian government assumes that half of the pension will be financed 
through the funded system.  
The political economy of the reform in Estonia has been relatively conflict-free. The reform 
maintains some aspects of the peculiarities of the socialist system, namely, a high flat-rate 
basic component that increases the system’s solidarity and vertical redistribution.  
 
D.  HUNGARY 
The present pension system was introduced in 1998. The new legislation replaced the old 
architecture with a multi-pillar one for all workers. For those who got pension rights under the 
old system, participation in the second tier is optional, while it is mandatory for newcomers to 
the labor market. 22 
 
The  first (public and mandatory) pillar  maintains the  defined-benefit principles. The 
contribution rate is 26.5% of the wage bill, and indexation relates partly to price growth and 
partly to wage growth. The r etirement age is fixed at 62 for  both men (since  2000) and 
women (since 2009). From 2013,  pension benefits will be gradually lowered. New 
mechanisms to calculate the  pension  amount will be introduced (e.g. calculation of the 
pension base from gross instead of net salaries, lower accrual rates, etc.). Means-tested 
benefits are provided to people in need who do not have a sufficient contribution record. 
The second (public/private and mandatory) pillar  consists of supplementary funded 
pensions based on the fully-funded method of financing. Contributions (8% of wages) are 
collected and managed by private institutions. Benefits are indexed following the same rules 
adopted for the first tier. Pension funds officially take the form of mutual savings associations 
whose members are co-owners of the fund. Pension funds are supervised by the State 
Financial Supervisory Authority, which issues fund licenses. The supplementary tier covers 
around 2 million people, representing 50% of the economically active population.  
Mandatory pension programs are then supplemented by  voluntary  schemes,  which were 
already well developed by the late 1990s. Contributions to the voluntary and private programs 
give the right to pensions being paid as a lump sum or an annuity. Together, the mandatory 
and voluntary funded programs cover more than 80% of the labor force. In 2007, Hungarian 
funds managed assets equaling 11% of GDP. 
Hungary witnessed perhaps the most dramatic political discussion of its pension reform. The 
(socialist) government created the multi-pillar system in 1997. This was later scaled down by 
the next (conservative) government in 1998– 1999, but 2003 saw another turn that increased 
the role of the funded pillar again. These frequent changes and other inconsistencies have 
undermined the Hungarian pension system’s credibility. In this respect,  it is open to 
speculation whether the reduction of the pension replacement rate introduced by the 1998 
reform, which should limit the future deficit (through a combination of an increase in the legal 
retirement age and a change in the benefits formula), will be implemented or modified. 
 
E.  LATVIA 
The present pension system was introduced through a pension reform adopted in 1996, which 
resembles the revised Swedish model. The pension system is based on three main pillars.  
The  first (public and mandatory) pillar  consists of earnings-related pensions with a 
notionally defined contribution (NDC) provision. It is financed by a 20% contribution rate. 
Coverage is not universal but related to employment, and it contains no guarantee of a 
subsistence pension for everybody. People with no or insufficient contributions are covered 
by social assistance schemes (in particular through social maintenance benefits). The 
retirement age at the beginning of the 1990s was 60 years for both men and women (with the 
option of early retirement for women) and was later increased to 62 for both sexes (reached in 
2003 for men and in 2008 for women). Early retirement is  possible 2 years prior  to the 
minimum retirement age (only 80% of  the  pension is paid). Latvia uses progressive 
indexation of pensions whereby lower pensions are indexed by the CPI plus 50% of real wage 
growth, pensions around the median are indexed by the CPI only, and the highest 1.5% of 
pensions are not indexed at all.  
The second pillar is mandatory for all workers born after 1971. The contribution rate was 2% 
in 2001– 2006 and is scheduled to reach 10% of the wage bill in 2010. This supplementary tier 
is both regulated and administered by the State Social Insurance Agency, while until 2003 
decisions about the investment of assets were taken by  the asset manager, i.e., the State 23 
 
Treasury. Since then, participants have been able to choose between state and private asset 
managers. At retirement, the insured person can either convert the capital into annuities 
provided by life insurance companies, or add it to the PAYG scheme. In 2008, the second-tier 
assets amounted to 3% of GDP.  
The third voluntary and private pillar is represented by supplementary funded pensions. 
They are run by private institutions and can be open and/or closed-end funds (the latter based 
on collective agreements). According to the national accounts, the level of assets in 2003 was 
particularly low (0.3% of GDP). 
Pension reform  in Latvia was facilitated by the  severe  1995 economic crisis, which 
highlighted the economic shortcomings of the previous system. However, the government’s 
plans were successfully blocked and postponed by the Latvian trade unions. The government 
sought to increase support for the pension reform by providing higher pensions to specific 
groups, such as the police, the army, children of those killed in 1991 by the Soviet Army, and, 
amusingly, those parliamentarians who voted for Latvia’s independence in 1990. Moreover, 
Latvia faces the fastest decrease in population among the EU-27: by 2050, its population is 
expected to fall by 20%. This will be accompanied by a relatively modest rise in the old age 
dependency ratio from 23% in 2004 to 55% in 2050.  
 
F.  LITHUANIA 
The present pension system was introduced in December 2002 and reformed again in 2004. 
The system has two pillars –  PAYG and funded.  
The first (state and mandatory) PAYG pillar was overhauled in 1995 and is financed by a 
26% contribution rate. The social insurance benefit consists of two parts: a flat-rate basic part 
for the insured who have paid contributions for the mandatory insurance period,  and  a 
supplementary part only for those who have made contributions while working under a labor 
contract. The average net replacement rate  is 40% (for workers with 30 years of 
contributions), with a large redistributive impact. The retirement age is 62 years and 6 months 
for men and 60 years for women. Early retirement is available for the long-term unemployed 
only. The government, however, provides two different types of minimum social pensions 
financed through the state budget. At 5.3% in 2000, public pension spending in Lithuania was 
among the lowest in the enlarged EU. 
The second pillar is mandatory and funded, represented by supplementary funded pensions 
introduced in 2004. Originally, 2.5% of the wage could be shifted to pension funds (and/or 
life insurance companies), but the rate was gradually increased to 5.5% by 2007. Purchasing 
an  annuity upon retirement is mandatory for all but very small pensions, which can be 
withdrawn as a lump sum. Total assets under management reached 1.5% of GDP in 2006. In 
late 2008, the Lithuanian government proposed to scale back the contribution to 3%. 
The additional voluntary and private pillars are represented by voluntary accumulation for 
old age in pension funds or with insurance companies. Its growth is favored by tax incentives. 
The expected future financial strains on the pension budget comprise the combined effect of 
the present high-level contributions and low-level benefits provided by the basic pillar, which 
would need to be increased in the near future to improve the adequacy of public pensions. In 
fact, 36% of old-age benefits are below the relative poverty level. 
Politically, Lithuania represents a cautious reformer along the lines of the Czech Republic. 
The main features of the former Soviet-based system were maintained throughout the 1990s 
and only the 2002 reform established voluntary pension funds. A further reform enacted in 24 
 
2004 introduced a strengthened funded pillar. Latvia’s demographic outlook is similar to 
Lithuania’s: the population is shrinking and will decrease by as much as 16% by 2050, but 
due to low life expectancy the old age dependency ratio will rise to only 45% and pension 
expenditures will not grow significantly.  
 
G.  POLAND 
The present pension system is characterized by the coexistence of the old pension system 
inherited from the communist period and the new one adopted in Poland in 1999. For present 
pensioners (still covered by the old system) the public pension scheme is the major source of 
income after retirement. The system combines an NDC pillar topped up with a minimum 
pension and a funded pillar. The system is financed by a contribution rate of 19.52% (12.22% 
to finance the NDC pensions and 7.3% for the funded scheme) of the wage bill plus 13% for 
disability. The ceiling is 250% of the national average wage. The state, however, pays 90% of 
the farmers’ pension scheme (1.8% of GDP). 
The first (public and mandatory) pillar consists of minimum pensions paid on condition 
that the insured person has achieved a certain number of years of service (25 for men and 20 
for women), and NDC benefits. The retirement age remains gender-specific and is 65 for men 
and 60 for women. Early retirement possibilities were abolished. 
The second (public/private and mandatory) pillar  comprises supplementary funded 
pensions taking the form of provident funds. Employees have the right to choose the fund in 
which to invest their contributions under the supervision of the state. Pension contributions 
(paid only by employees) g ive the right to an annuity after retirement. According to 
projections, the share of the funded tier in total old-age mandatory pensions should be about 
40% of the total pension for people who have contributed their whole career. In 2003, the 
assets from the second tier amounted to 5.5% of GDP.  
The third pillar is private, individual and/or occupational, and voluntary. Given the relative 
high replacement rate granted by the first two tiers in the mandatory pillar, these last ones are 
not well developed.  
Demographic trends are for the moment less alarming in Poland than in the rest of Europe. 
High fertility rates in both the past and the present have allowed old-age dependency to be 
reduced by a relative young population. Nevertheless, the government expects to finance a 
transitory deficit of the system well into the 2030s. Combined with the expensive pension 
system for farmers, this requires relative high contribution rates of 32.5% of wages and a 
government subsidy of as much as 3% of GDP.  
The Polish pension reform of 1999 was established with the aid of an inclusive, wide-based 
group of experts headed by a World Bank expert. The reform was even supported by the trade 
unions and still maintained crucial components such as an increase in the retirement age and a 
switch to an NDC system within the first pillar. The only significant group that avoided the 
reform was Polish farmers, which remain under a specific system.  
 
H.  ROMANIA 
Romania reformed its pension system very late, in 2005. The reform aimed at stabilizing the 
financial balance of the system, eliminating extensive non-contributive claims, and at 
introducing a privately managed fully funded pillar. 25 
 
The reform of the first pillar aimed at increasing the real value of pensions. It increases the 
retirement age gradually to 65 for men and 60 for women and changes the benefit formula, 
based on a scoring system which takes into account the actual revenues for the entire period 
of service. The reform also tightened  the  rules for indemnity pensions and reduced  the 
contribution rate for employers from 22% in 2005 to 19.75% in 2006 and further to 19.50% in 
2007 and 18% in 2008. 
The second pillar, introduced in 2008, consists of privately-managed obligatory pensions. 
Initially, the 2% share of social contributions p ayable by employees under 35 will be 
channeled to privately-managed pension funds. For workers between 35 and 45, this 
contribution is optional. The contribution rate is set to increase gradually over a period of 8 
years, until it reaches 6%. 
Pension funds are supervised by the Private Pension System Supervising Commission and 
participants maintain individual accounts which give them ownership of the net assets. 
Pensions are payable at the retirement age from the first pillar and must be annuitized. Each 
pension fund will have to attract at least 50,000 people. Those persons who fail to sign up 
with a fund manager within the deadline will be automatically assigned to fund managers 
based on a formula. 
The third pillar, stipulating private occupational schemes, came into effect on January 1, 
2005; but was never implemented. Instead, these funds were converted into individual 
optional pension schemes in 2007. Contributions are tax-deductible (up to a limit) and may be 
matched (tax-free) by employers.  
Romania implemented its pension reform while being accepted as an EU member (Romania 
joined the EU in January 2007). EU accession motivated the main stated goal of the reform: to 
increase labor participation, especially among older workers. Only 40% of the labor force 
between 55 and 64 works in Romania, and the participation rate is as low as 14% for workers 
above 65 years of age. This low participation was driven by lax early retirement rules, which 
were significantly tightened  in  the reform. Moreover, some 1 million farmers do not 
contribute to the system, along with an estimated 1 –2 million workers in the shadow 
economy.  
The reform was long delayed and was amended more than 20 times in the Parliament. All 
political parties accepted the reform only hesitantly and as an EU package. Public support, 
given the reform’s bad timing, has been lukewarm so far.  
 
I.  SLOVAKIA 
Slovakia shared its pension system with the Czech Republic, from which it separated in 1993, 
but reformed it substantially in  2005 by introducing a three-pillar architecture. The new 
system affects new entrants to the labor market, while for already active people the new 
system is optional.  
The first pillar is mandatory and public. It is financed by a contribution rate of 9% of wages 
(a  further 9% goes to t he second pillar and  6% goes  to  disability benefits). T he t otal 
contribution rate is 24% (firms pay 17% and employees pay 7%). Social pensions have been 
abolished and elderly people in need receive social assistance benefits. Early retirement has 
been reintroduced: benefits are reduced by 0.5% for every month of missed contributions until 
the legal retirement age is reached. A reserve fund was introduced to guarantee future 
pensions (it is financed by contributions paid by voluntarily insured persons and the self-
employed). Old-age benefits are provided on the basis of a minimum contribution period of 26 
 
10 years (previously 25 years) with a legal retirement age of 62 for women (to be reached in 
2015) and 62 for men (in 2007). 
The second pillar is mandatory, fundamentally private, and fully funded. Financial resources 
come from splitting the total contributions originally paid to the first pillar. Under the 2005 
legislation, the second-tier contribution rate  is set at  9% of  wages. The new legislation 
includes a relative rate of return guarantee: the value of the funds’ assets is not allowed to fall 
below a certain limit. It is not possible to increase contributions to the second pillar above the 
fixed contribution rate. Transition costs related to the introduction of the second tier will be 
partially covered by the privatized share of the Slovak Gas Company.  
The third pillar is voluntary, fully funded, and private. It is organized by funded schemes 
implemented through occupational funds, pension insurance, life insurance, and special kinds 
of bank savings accounts. While the mandatory pillar is expected to provide between 50 and 
60% of gross replacement rates, the voluntary one is expected to provide between 20 and 
25%. 
The Slovak reform was a part of a radical reform program of the centre-right coalition that 
was elected in 2002. The coalition pushed several major reforms through the Parliament (a 
flat tax, pension reform, health care reform), preventing the opposition  from organizing 
effectively against it. The g overnment lost  the 2006 election, partly due to  its unpopular 
reforms, but the new left-wing government has not eliminated the reformed system. It has, 
however, allowed workers to return from the reformed system to the fully PAYG system (this 
was originally possible only for one year, but has now  been  extended permanently). The 
centre-left has also complained that the pension system balance is to worsen as contributions 
are channeled into the new private pillar. One can argue that the centre-right coalition tied the 
hands of its successor in creating very challenging fiscal conditions in the short term that do 
not allow any slack in fiscal performance unrelated to the pension reform. 
 
J.  SLOVENIA 
The pension system in Slovenia was first reformed in 1992, while the second Pension and 
Disability Insurance Act was approved in 1999 (and amended again in 2001). The present 
pension system is Bismarckian. It is a comprehensive system, covering all the employed and 
the self-employed, and is based mainly on public provisions, but consists also of a second and 
third pillar ( albeit  less  developed  than in other European countries). Social insurance 
programs are combined with social assistance provisions providing public coverage for people 
in need. 
The first (public and mandatory) pillar consists of an earnings-related scheme financed 
through social contributions and related to employment.  The  contribution rate is 24.35% 
(firms pay 8.85%, employees pay 15.5%, no ceiling, no floor), but covers only 68% of all 
pension expenditures. The rest is financed from the state budget. The minimum contribution 
period is 15 years. Moreover, pensioners with low incomes or incomplete contributions can 
apply for a pension income supplement. Social assistance is then given to people in need 
through a national pension, which is still a means-tested benefit. The retirement age changed 
in 2000: each year now adds a 1.5% pension accrual. The retirement age increases to 61 for 
women (to be reached in 2029) and 63 for men (in 2009). Early retirement is possible from 58 
(men) and 56 (women). The effective retirement ages are low (59 for men, 56 for women). 
Indexation is related to wages instead of prices (at least in principle), but the ratio of the 
average pension to the average net wage fell from 76% in 1995 to 70% in 2004. 27 
 
The  second (private and voluntary) pillar  comprises supplementary pension funds. 
Schemes must be approved by the  Ministry of Labor, Family and Social Affairs. 
Supplementary mutual funds must be regulated by the Securities Market Agency. For public 
sector employees, a mandatory scheme was created in 2003. As a consequence of very 
favorable tax incentives, supplementary pensions are expected to grow in the coming years. In 
2000, the second pillar covered 11% of all insured persons in the first mandatory pillar; by 
2005 this share had reached 51%. In 2006, collective voluntary occupational schemes had 
total assets of 2.7% of GDP. 
The third pillar is private and voluntary, consisting of individual savings in the form of life 
insurance, and is administered by insurance companies. Premiums paid to this third pillar are 
subject to tax relief. 
Slovenia can be regarded as an example of a gradualist approach to reform. It is still lagging 
behind, though it started earlier with bold plans. A government white paper of November 
1997 contained radical proposals for a fundamental restructuring of the pension system: a 
large downsizing of the first (public) pillar, and the introduction of a mandatory, privately 
funded second pillar. These reform proposals were strongly influenced by measures 
championed by the World Bank. However, because of strong opposition from various groups 
–  trade unions, opposition parties, and certain influential economists –  the proposals were 
watered down considerably and the g overnment maintains a  crucial role in the pension 
system. The Slovenian system is one of the most in danger of escalating expenditures, as the 
dependency ratio explodes from 21% in 2004 to almost 60% in 2050. The system still allows 
very generous early retirement, increasing the pressure on public finances. 
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Appendix 2: Pension Reforms in the EU-8: Data 
Pension reforms in the EU-8 






























CZ  1996  DB  61/63  Prices/wages  28%  0%  Vol.  n.a.  3.6% 
Estonia  2002  DB  63/63  Prices/wages  24%  2%  Mand.  6%  2.8% 
Hungary  1997  DB  62/62  Prices/wages  26.5%  26%  Mand.  8%   4.0% 
Latvia  2001  DB  62/62  Prices/wages  20%  0%  Mand.  10%  0.3% 
Lithuania  2004  DB  60/62.5  Wages  26%  0%  Mand.  5.5%  0.3% 
Poland  1999  NDC  60/65  Prices/wages  32.5%  45%  Mand.  7.3%  7.1% 
Slovakia  2005  DC  62/62  Wages  24%  10%  Mand.  9%  n.a. 
Slovenia  2000  DB  61/63  Wages  24.35%  15%  Vol.  n.a.  1.4% 
 
Fiscal institutions in the EU-8 
  Preparation stage (2006 
for Slovakia and CZ) 
Authorization stage (ditto)  Implementation stage 
  1997  2003  Change  1997  2003  Change  1997  2003  Change 
CZ  1.00  1.75  +0.75  2.67  2.34  -0.33  2.67  2.67  0 
Estonia  2.25  2.25  0  2.00  2.34  +0.33  3.67  3.67  0 
Hungary  1.50  1.50  0  1.33  1.33  0  2.00  1.33  -0.67 
Latvia  2.50  2.50  0  0.67  0.67  0  3.67  3.67  0 
Lithuania  1.00  1.75  +0.75  1.67  1.67  0  3.67  3.00  -0.67 
Poland  1.50  2.25  +0.75  1.00  3.00  +2.00  3.00  3.00  0 
Slovakia  0.75  2.25  +1.50  1.34  1.67  +0.33  2.34  3.33  +1.00 
Slovenia  2.75  2.75  0  2.33  2.33  0  2.67  2.67  0 
 
  Overall index (2006 for Slovakia and CZ) 
  1997  2003  Change 
CZ  2.09  2.33  +0.24 
Estonia  2.61  2.72  +0.09 
Hungary  2.00  1.50  -0.50 
Latvia  2.26  2.26  0 
Lithuania  2.09  2.12  +0.03 
Poland  1.82  2.72  +0.90 
Slovakia  1.46  2.75  +1.29 
Slovenia  2.56  2.56  0 
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